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Dickinson Law Review
Volume XXXVIII

OCTOBER, 1933

Number 1

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
At the election to be held over the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania on Tuesday, November 7, 1933, there will be
submitted for adoption by the people twelve resolutions
proposing amendments to the present constitution. It may
be timely, therefore, to present some general observations
on the subject of proposed amendments and also some further observations directed specifically to the twelve resolutions to which reference has been made, all for the purpose
of aiding those interested in the subject of amendments to
understand the processes of their making and the import of
those under particular consideration.
Article 18, Section 1 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania provides as follows:
"Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives; and, if the same shall be agreed to by a
majority of the members elected to each House, such
proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered
on their journals with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall
cause the same to be published three months before the
next general election, in at least two newspapers in
every county in which such newspapers shall be published; and if, in the General Assembly next afterwards chosen, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a majority of the members
elected to each House, the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause the same again to be published in
the manner aforesaid; and such proposed amendment
or amendments shall be submitted to the qualified
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electors of the State in such manner, and at such time
at least three months after being so agreed to by the
two Houses, as the General Assembly shall prescribe;
and, if such amendment or amendments shall be approved by a majority of those voting thereon, such
amendment or amendments shall become a part of the
Constitution; but no amendment or amendments shall
be submitted oftener than once in five years. When
two or more amendments shall be submitted they shall
be voted upon separately."
NOT LEGISLATION

In Commonwealth v. Griest, 196 Pa. 396, it was held
that an amendment to the Constitution proposed by Joint
Resolution of the General Assembly need not be submitted
to the Governor for his approval or veto, Green, C. J. observing :
"It will be observed that the method of creating
amendments to the constitution is fully provided for
by this article of the existing constitution. It is a separate and independent article standing alone and entirely unconnected with any other subject. Nor does
it contain any reference to any other provision of the
constitution as being needed, or to be used, in carrying
out the particular work to which the 18th article is devoted. It is a system entirely complete in itself, requiring no extraneous aid, either in matters of detail
or of general scope to its effectual execution. It is also
necessary to bear in mind the character of the work
for which it provides. It is constitution making, it is
a concentration of all the power of the people in establishing organic law for the commonwealth, for it is
provided by the article, 'If such amendment or
amendments shall be approved by a majority of those
voting thereon, such amendment or amendments shall
become a part of the constitution.' It is not lawmaking, which is a distinct and separate function, but
it is a specific exercise of the power of a people to
make its constitution. Recurring to this subject later
on, and proceeding now to analyze the requirements
of the 18th article in the process of creating amendments, we notice in their order the successive particulars to be observed. First, the amendment is to be
proposed in the senate or house. Second, it must be
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.agreed to by a majority of the members elected to
each house.'
Third, it must 'be entered on their
journals with the yeas and nays taken thereon.'
Fourth, in immediate sequence to the entry on the
journals and as a part of the same sentence, the article
provides, 'and the Secretary of the Commonwealth
shall cause the same to be published three months before the next general election in at least two newspapers in every county in which such newspapers shall
be published'."
In Sweeney u. King, 289 Pa. 92, the question was presented as to the propriety of the adoption by the General
Assembly at a special session of a resolution proposing an
amendment to the constitution despite the fact that the
subject matter thereof was not referred to in the Governor's
proclamation calling the session. A bill was filed to enjoin
the Secretary of the Commonwealth from publishing the
resolution as provided by Article 18, Section 1 of the Constitution. The lower court dismissed the bill and the
Supreme Court on appeal expressed itself in accord with
that conclusion, Simpson, J. declaring:
"The constitutional provison relied on by plaintiff is article III, section 25, which says, 'When the
General Assembly shall be convened in special session, there shall be no legislation upon subjects other
than those designated in the proclamation of the Governor calling such session. We held in Commonwealth v.

Griest, 196 Pa. 396, that constitutional

amendments are not 'legislation'. As it thus appears
that they are among the 'matters left open by the written Constitution' (Likins's Petition No. 1, 223 Pa. 456,
460), the legislature may proceed in relation to them
in special or in general sessions, at its discretion:
Com. v. Stewart, 286 Pa. 511.
In People v. Curry, 130 Cal. 82, a different conclusion is reached, but Com. v. Griest, supra, which we
believe to be right and adhere to, makes the former
opinion of no importance here, especially as every
other jurisdiction which has considered the matter
agrees with our opinion: Johnson v. Craft, 205 Ala.
386; Mitchell v. Hopper, 153 Ark. 515; McCall v.
Wilkins, 145 Georgia 342; In re Opinion of the Justices
(Me.), 107 Atl. 673; Warfield v. Vanditer, 101 Md.
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78; State . Dahl, 6 North Dakota 81; State v. Marcus,
160 Wisc. 354.
The decree of the court below is affirmed and the
appeal is dismissed at the cost of appellant."
MEMBERS ELECTED
A resolution for an amendment may be proposed in
either branch of the Legislature but it must "be agreed to
by a majority of the members elected to each House". The
question has some times arisen as to what constitutes a
majority of the members elected. In the 1933 regular session of the General Assembly the House by resolution
adopted put itself on record as to its interpretation of the
various expressions in the Constitution concerning majorities and members elected. The resolution was as follows :
"Whereas, Various sections of the Constitution
contain provisions referring to the number of votes required for the transaction of certain business; and
Whereas, there is no uniformity in the Constitution in the use of these terms and it is desirable that a
construction be made by the Members of the House in
order that definiteprecedents may be established to determine the number of votes required for each action;
and
Whereas, Such clauses are as follows:
"A majority of each House"-(Art. 11, Sec. 10.)
"A majority of all the Members elected"-(Art.
III, Sec. 4.)
"Two-thirds of all the Members elected"-(Art.
III, Sec. 17.)
"Two-thirds of both Houses according to rules
and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill"-(Art.
III, Sec. 26.)
"Two-thirds of all the Members elected to .that

House"-(Art. IV, Sec. 15.)
therefore be it
Resolved, That the term "Members elected" as
used in the Constitution directly or by reference, shall
be construed to include all Members elected in accordance with law, whether or not actually Members
of the House when action is taken, but shall not be
construed to include Members authorized to be elected
by law where there was a failure to elect;
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Resolved, That the term "a majority of each
House" as used in the Constitution shall be construed
to mean a majority of those Members elected, sworn
and living, whose membership has not been terminated
by death, resignation or otherwise, or held in abeyance
by failure to qualify.
Resolved, That any rule of the House of Representatives founded on a provision of the Constitution,
inconsistent with this interpretation, shall, until amended, be construed in accordance with the Constitutional
provision upon which founded."
Before the vote was taken adopting this resolution the
gentleman from Franklin made some extended remarks explaining the various situations which had arisen, the provisions of the Constitution in detail and the law as it had
been collated in other jurisdictions having similar constitutional provisions. These remarks will be found in Volume
15, No. 24 of the Legislative Journal of the Session 1933,
130th of the General Assembly, recording the proceedings
of Monday, February 27, 1933, at pages 781-784 inclusive.
TWICE ADOPTED
Article 18, Section 1 provides that the proposed amendment must be twice adopted by the majority of the members
elected to each House, and the two respective adoptions
must be by consecutive but separate General Assemblies.
Each General Assembly is elected for the biennium and
during any session, regular or special during that biennium
a constitutional amendment resolution may be adopted but
the second adoption must be "inthe General Assembly next
afterwards chosen."
PUBLICATION
It is the duty of the Secretary of the Commonwealth
to publish the respective adoptions as made by the General
Assembly and on the authority of Commonwealth v.Griest,
supra, he cannot allege as grounds for refusing to publish
a proposed amendment to the Constitution as provided by
Article 18 that no appropriation had been made to defray
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the cost of publication. Furthermore, it is distinctly provided by the Article under consideration that the publication following the first adoption by the General Assembly
shall be "three months before the next general election, in at
least two newspapers in every county in which such newspapers shall be published,"
In Commonwealth v. King, 278 Pa. 280, at page 282,
Moschzisker, C. J. explains:
"There is a real reason for requiring the advertisement prior to the general election when the legislature has still to pass on a proposed amendment. Members of the general assembly are chosen only at general elections; hence, as the opinion under review well
says, 'The purpose of the (constitutional) requirement
of publication three months before the next general
election (following the first legislative agreement to
the proposed amendment (this being 'the only place
where the phrase 'the general election' appears') )
was to give the electors an abundant opportunity to be
advised concerning the proposed amendment and to
ascertain the policy of candidates for the general assembly to be (next afterwards chosen), 'because they
would have to pass upon the proposed amendment
when it came before the general assembly a second
time.' This, as noted by the court below, is suggested
by us in Commonwealth v. Griest 196 Pa. 396, 415."
In Commonwealth v. King, supra, decided June 23,
1923, the question was upon the second publication and as
to whether the Secretary of the Commonwealth might advertise prior to a municipal election in an odd numbered
year a proposed constitutional amendment which had been
agreed to by the Legislature a second time. On this score
the learned Chief Justice further explains:
"On the other hand, when a proposed amendment
reaches the stage of the present one, it is evident no
such reason as that above stated applies, for, to again
quote from the opinion under review, 'the purpose of the
second publication (which is the one here in question)
is to advise the electors themselves, so that they may
vote intelligently (and directly) upon the proposed
amendment,' and 'this published information would
have the same effect, if made before a municipal elec-
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tion, as if made prior to a general election.' The constitutional provision calling on the Secretary of the
Commonwealth to cause the second notice 'to be published in the manner aforesaid' means that the required
notice must appear 'in at least two newspapers in every
county' in which that course is possible; its appearance
in the proper publications three months before the day
set for the electorate to pass on the proposed amendment is sufficient."
The Act of April 3, 1923, P. L. 55, construed in
Commonwealth v. King, supra, was an amendment to the
original Act of June 7, 1913, P. L. 693, entitled "An Act
prescribing the manner and time of submitting to the qualified electors of the State proposed amendments to the Constitution in order to determine whether the same be approved by a majority of those voting thereon, as provided by
Article 18, Section 1, of the Constitution."
The law in question was further amended by the Act
of April 27, 1925, P. L. 311 and now reads as follows:
"Section 1. Be it enacted, etc., That, unless the
General Assembly shall prescribe otherwise with respect to any particular proposed amendment or amendments, the manner and time of submitting to the qualified electors of the State any proposed amendment or
amendments to the Constitution for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the same shall be approved by
a majority of those voting thereon, the said amendment or amendments heretofore, or which may hereafter be proposed, and which have not been submitted to the qualified electors of the State, shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the State for the purpose aforesaid at the first municipal or general election at which such amendment or amendments may be
legally submitted to the electors, and which election
shall occur at least three months after the date upon
which such proposed amendment or amendments shall
have been agreed to for the second time by a majority
of the members elected to each house of the General
Assembly, as provided in article eighteen, section one,
of the Constitution. Said election shall be opened.
held and closed, upon said election day in the manner
and within the hours at and within which the said
election is directed to be opened, held and closed, and
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in accordance with the provisions of the election laws
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the
amendments thereof, and supplements thereto. Such
proposed amendment or amendments to the Constitution shall be so printed in full upon the ballots, and followed by the words "Yes" and "No", as to give each
voter a clear opportunity to express his approval or
disapproval of said proposed amendment or amendments, by a cross mark (X) in a square of sufficient
size at the right of the words "Yes" or "No".
The provisions of this act are severable, and, if
any of its provisions are held to be unconstitutional,
such decision shall not affect or impair the remaining
provisions of this act. It is hereby declared as a legislative intent that this act would have been passed
had such unconstitutional provision not been included therein."
In Conflicting Amendments, 62 Pitts. 437, 1914, it was
stated to be the duty of the Secretary to advertise several
proposed amendments though if each were adopted the constitutional provisions on the same subject would be conflict'ing.
The remedy which may be invoked to compel action
as to publication by the Secretary of the Commonwealth is
the writ of mandamus or by injunction to restrain publication.
In Taylor u. King, 284 Pa. 235, Sadler, J. said:
"The Constitution of the State may be legally
amended in the manner specifically set forth therein,
or a new one may be put in force by a convention duly
assembled, its action being subject to ratification by the
people, but these are the only ways in which the fundamental law can be altered. If directed by the legislattre, after compliance with the constitutional requirements, it becomes the duty of the Secretary of
the Commonwealth to advertise, as directed by the
18th section, and if he improperly refuses through the
result of a misunderstanding as to his duty, the courts
will require by mandamus that this be done (Com. v.
Griest, 196 Pa. 396), though it be necessary, because
of delay, to hold the election at a time later than that
named by the legislature.
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"There may be technical error in the manner in
which a proposed amendment is adopted, or in its advertisement, yet, if followed, unobjected to, by approval of the electors, it becomes a part of the Constitution. Legal complaints to the submission may be
made prior to taking the vote, but, if once sanctioned.
the amendment is embodied therein, and cannot be attacked, either directly or collaterally, because of any
mistake antecedent thereto. Even though it be submitted at an improper time, it is effective for all purposes when accepted by the majority : Armstrong v.
King, 281 Pa. 207."
FIVE YEAR RULE

Article 18, Section 1, stipulates, inter alia, "but no
amendment or amendments shall be submitted oftener than
once in five years. When two or more amendments shall
be submitted they shall be voted upon separately."
In Armstrong v.King. 281 Pa. 207, the question arose
as to the meaning of the portion of the section just quoted.
Simpson, J. explained:
"It is clear that unless we wholly ignore the
words 'but no amendment or amendments shall be submitted oftener than once in five years,'-a conclusion
for which no one does, or reasonably can contend,we must either construe the language exactly as it is
written, namely, as prohibiting the submission of any
amendments 'oftener than once in five years,' or we
must interpret it as referring to the amendments specified in the preceding part of the article, which would
result in precluding only the resubmission of amendments once defeated by the people. We cannot take
this latter alternative, however, because the language
used will not permit us to do so. When it was intended to refer to the amendments dealt with in the
earlier part of the article, the clause so providing was
always preceded by the word 'such'. Thus it is said,
if'any amendment or amendments' are agreed to by
the legislature, 'such proposed amendment or amendments' shall be entered on their journals and duly advertised, and if the next legislature shall agree to 'such
proposed amendment or amendments' another publication shall be had, and 'such proposed amendment or
amendments' shall be submitted to the electors for ap-
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proval, and if 'such proposed amendment or amendments' are approved by a majority of those voting
thereon, 'such amendment or amendments shall become a part of the Constitution.' On the other hand,
the prohibiting clause does not use this or any similar
word; it simply says 'but no amendment or amendments shall be submitted oftener than once in five
years'. This broadening of the language necessarily
implies an intentional broadening of thought; hence it
must be construed as it is written, namely, as a purpose on the part of the people that they shall not be
asked to amend their Constitution 'oftener than once
in five years'."
It follows from this reasoning that the Constitution can
only be subjected to amendment by vote of the people under
the terms of Article 18, Section 1, every five years. The
last time amendments were submitted was in 1928, consequently, the next period is 1933 and the period following
would be 1938 and so on.
MULTIPLICITY

In Taylor v. King, 284 Pa. 235, the question was raised
as to whether a resolution for an amendment could contain
two propositions, viz, the right to increase the bonded indebtedness for road purposes and also to pay a soldier's
bonus. It was argued that the electors in marking their
ballots could not differentiate between the questions presented. The Supreme Court, per Sadler, J. observed that
there was merit in the contention and cited 12 C. J. 690 and
by comparison Hollinger u. King, 282 Pa. 157, but the question was not decided. In the Resolution known as Number C-1 adopted for the first time at the Legislative Session
of 1931, proposing an amendment to Article 3, Section 18,
two propositions were presented, viz; assistance to mothers
having dependent children and to aged persons without
adequate means of support by reason of indigency, disease,
infirmity or other disability. This proposed amendment
was only acted upon in the Regular Session of 1933 by the
House and, consequently, failed for presentation to the
people.
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As Article 18 distinctly specifies that when two or more
amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted upon
separately it would appear that sound principle would dictate only one proposition to be inserted in a proposed amendment. For. example in C-1 as cited had it appeared upon
the November ballot those favoring mothers' assistance but
not favoring old age pensions or vice versa would be presented with a dilemma in the casting of the ballot.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

By the current publications at least two newspapers
in every county in which such newspapers shall be published carry the notices of the Secretary of the Commonwealth
setting forth in full the twelve resolutions proposing amendments to the present Constitution and to be voted upon at
the coming election to be held Tuesday, November 7, 1933.
These resolutions are numbered from one to twelve consecutively and will now be taken up in the discussion
seriatim.
RESOLUTION NO. 1

This resolution embodies an amendment to Article 3,
Section 18 which as now constituted reads as follows :
"No appropriations, except for pensions or gratuities for military services, shall be made for charitable,
educational or benevolent purposes, to any person or
community, nor to any denominational or sectarian
institution, corporation or association."
The amendment would read as follows:
"Section 18. No appropriations, except for pensions or gratuities for military services and to blind
persons twenty-one years of age and upwards, shall
be made for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes, to any person or community, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution, corporation or
association."
The effect of the amendment would be to permit the
General Assembly to make appropriations as gratuities to
persons who were blind and of the age of twenty-one years
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and upwards. As the section now stands appropriations
for gratuities are confined to military services and with that
exception prohibits appropriations for charitable, educational, or benevolent purposes to any person or community
or to any denominational or sectarian institution, corporation or association.
For two interesting recent decisions on this particular
section, see Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 490 and Collins '.

Martin, 290 Pa. 388.
A criticism of the amendment as proposed is that it
makes a rather invidious distinction between those who are
blind and those suffering from some other form of physical
disability and with a preference in favor of the former.
Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish the merits of the
blind as a class from those who are aged. Another weakness is that the specification is to blind persons who are
twenty-one years of age and upwards and does not distinguish those who need aid from those who are financially
independent.
RESOLUTION NO. 2

This resolution would add to Article 9 a new section
to read as follows:
"Section 17. In addition to the powers heretofore granted, the General Assembly may authorize
cities and boroughs to assess the costs of highway improvement, consisting of paving, curbing, and the incidental grading and draining, or either or any of
them, upon abutting property, in all cases where no
prior assessment has been made for a similar improvement."
The following comment upon this proposed amendment
is found in the issue Number 1107. August 8, 1933, of
Citizens' Business published by the Bureau of Municipal
Research, 311 S. Juniper Street, Philadelphia. under the
caption "The Highway Improvement Amendment":
"Owners of property fronting on streets in Pennsylvania cities and boroughs will be interested in a
proposed constitutional amendment, scheduled to ap-
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pear on the ballot this fall. It raises the question
whether certain street improvements must be paid for
by the taxpayers at large or whether abutting owners
may be assessed for them.
The Original-Paving Rule. In the late 1860's
Philadelphia levied against abutting owners the cost
of paving part of Broad Street with wooden blocks.
This was done by a special assessment authorized by
the legislature. Prior to that, Broad Street had been
paved with cobblestones, at the expense of the property-owners. One of the owners won a supreme
court decision that the law authorizing the second assessment was unconstitutional (Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146-1869). This decision has become
basic in Pennsylvania law. It upheld the power of a
municipality to levy a special assessment to the extent
of the benefit conferred by a public improvement, but
denied the power to levy a local tax (by special assessment) for general municipal purposes. It held that a
municipality could levy special assessments for an
original paving, but that after a street has been once
opened and paved, a repaving of it is for the benefit
of the municipality at large and must be paid for by
the taxpayers rather than by the abutting owners.
The Rule Resisted. The rule may seem somewhat arbitrary, but it does set up a standard which will
help the abutting owner to know when his liability is
at an end. This does not mean that the rule has been
easy to apply. There have been doubts as to what
constitutes an original paving. Whether a municipality has accepted a street has often been a difficult question of fact. And at one point the rule has been
rather stubbornly resisted as inequitable. Suppose the
cost of an original paving is not assessed against abutting owners, but is met by the taxpayers. Can the
abutting owners be assessed for a repaving? In 1915
the legislature authorized boroughs and townships in
such circumstances to assess one-third of the repaving
cost against the abutting owners. The borough of
Towanda levied such an assessment, but the Superior
Court held that it does not matter whether abutting
owners paid for the first paving or not; they cannot be
assessed for repaving; (Towanda v. Swingle, 90 Pa.
Super. 82-1927).
Amendment Proposed. A few months later the
1927 legislature approved a constitutional amendment
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which apparently was intended to revoke at least in
part the original-paving rule. It would authorize the
legislature to permit cities and boroughs 'to assess the
costs of highway improvement consisting of paving,
curbing, and the incidental grading and draining, or
either or any of them, upon abutting property, in all
cases where no prior assessment has been made for a
similar improvement.' The 1929 legislature again approved the amendment. Since then it has been silently waiting the next date for submission of amendments
to the voters-November 7, 1933.
How Many? How many Philadelphia streets
could be repaved at the abutting owners' expense if
this amendment is adopted which would have to be replaced at general expense if it is not adopted? We
do not know. Probably no one knows. But there are
probably many such streets."
RESOLUTION NO. 3

This resolution provides an amendment to Article 3,
Section 22, which at the present reads as follows:
"No act of the General Assembly shall authorize
the investment of trust funds by executors, administrators, guardians or other trustees, in the bonds or
stock of any private corporation, and such acts now
existing are avoided saving investments heretofore
made."
The amendment would read as follows:
"Section 22. The General Assembly may, from
time to time, by law, prescribe the nature and kind of
investments for trust funds to be made by executors,
administrators, trustees, guardians and other fiduciaries."
In support of the present constitutional provision and
as a sound argument against any change the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in 1910 in the case of Commonwealth v.
McConnell, 226 Pa. 244, thus spoke through Mestrezat, J.:
"We are not inclined to disturb the rule announced by Chief Justice Black more than half a century
ago in Hemphill's App., 18 Pa. 303, and since recognized and followed by this court. In delivering the
opinion in that case the Chief Justice said (p. 305):
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'In England it has been held for more than a century
past to be settled law, that a trustee can only protect
himself from risk, when he invests the trust fund in
real or government securities or makes the investment
in pursuance of an order by the court . . . The same
rule has been adopted in its whole length and breadth
In
by the courts of New York and New Jersey. ..
Pennsylvania this doctrine does not appear ever to
have been either affirmed or denied. . . But the time
has come when the interests and rights of trustees, as
well as orphans, married women and insane persons,
demand the settling of it, and we think think the rule
here ought to be as it is elsewhere.' In Worrell's
App., 23 Pa.44, Knox, J., delivering the opinion said (p.
48) : 'It may now be considered as settled law, that in
Pennsylvania an investment by a guardian or other trustee, unless authorized by the deed of trust, in the stock
of an incorporated company, whether a bank, railroad,
canal, manufacturing, or mining corporation, cannot
be made at the risk of a ward or other cestui que trust.
It is unnecessary to repeat the reasons which are the
foundation of this rule. In England and in this country the adoption of the rule has been found essentially
necessary for the protection of those who could not
protect themselves. It will not do to say that because
prudent men sometimes invest their own money in such
stocks, guardians may legally invest the estate of their
wards in like manner.' About thirty years later after
full argument and due consideration, we recognized
and enforced the rule announced in those cases in
Frankenfield's App., 11 W. N. C. 373. It was said
(p. 374) : 'This being so, the law regulating investments by committees of lunatics becomes applicable to
the case and controls it. The act of June 12, 1836,
Sec. 25, expressly directs that such investments must
be made under the direction of the court of common
pleas, and only exempts the committee from liability
for loss when he pursues this course and in good faith.
In Hemphill's App., 18 Pa. 303, it was firmly and definitely settled that a trustee can only protect himself
from risk when he invests the trust fund in real or governmental securities or makes the investment in pursuance of an order of court.'
The doctrine thus firmly established in this state
prohibits a trustee from investing the estate of his
cestui que trust in the bonds or stocks of a private corporation. The people of the commonwealth have at-
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tempted to enforce the rule by art. III, sec. 22, of the
present constitution, which prohibits the general assembly from authorizing the investment of trust funds
by a trustee in the bonds or stocks of any private corporation. Time has tested the wisdom of the rule,
and, as our cases declare, it is firmly established in this
commonwealth."
See also Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518.
RESOLUTION NO. 4
This resolution suggests an amendment to Article 9, by
adding the following section :
"Section 16. In addition to the purposes stated
in article nine, section four of th'is Constitution, the
State may be authorized by law to create debt and to
issue bonds, to the amount of fifty millions of dollars,
for the payment of compensation to certain persons
from this State who served in the Army, Navy or
Marine Corps of the United States during the war between the United States and Spain, between the
twenty-first day of April, one thousand eight hundred
and ninety-eight, and the thirteenth day of August,
one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, or who
served in the China Relief Expedition, in the Philippines or Guam, between the twenty-first day of April,
one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and the
fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and
two, or who served in the Army, Navy or Marine
Corps of the United States during the World War
between the sixth day of April, one thousand nine
hundred and seventeen, and the eleventh day of
November, one thousand nine hundred and eighteen."
The adoption of this amendment by the people will
authorize the General Assembly in its wisdom to create a
debt of fifty millions of dollars for the purpose of paying
compensation to Pennsylvania veterans who served in the
war with Spain, the Philippines, Guam, China and the
World War.
RESOLUTION NO. 5
This resolution provides an amendment to Article 8,
Section 1 which at present reads as follows:
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"Every male citizen twenty-one years of age.
possessing the following qualifications, shall be entitled
to vote at all elections, subject however to such laws
requiring and regulating the registration of electors
as the General Assembly may enact:
1. He shall have been a citizen of the United
States at least one month.
2. He shall have resided in the State one year
(or, having previously been a qualified elector or native born citizen of the State, he shall have removed
therefrom and returned, then six months), immediately
preceding the election.
3. He shall have resided in the election district
where he shall offer to vote at least two months immediately preceding the election.
4. If twenty-two years of age and upwards, he
shall have paid within two years a State or county tax,
which shall have been assessed at least two months
and paid at least one month before the election."
The amendment would read as follows:
"Section 1. Every citizen twenty-one years of
age. possessing the following qualifications, shall be
entitled to vote at all elections, subject, however, to
such laws requiring and regulating the registration of
electors as the General Assembly may enact.
1. He or she shall have been a citizen of the
United States at least one month.
2. He or she shall have resided in the State one
year ( or, having previously been a qualified elector or
native-born citizen of the State, he or she shall have
removed therefrom and returned, then six months)
immediately preceding the election.
3. He or she shall have resided in the election
district where he or she shall offer to vote at least two
months immediately preceding the election."
The adoption of this amendment by the people will accomplish two changes, first, the phraseology is made to conform to the substance of the Nineteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States which was declared to be
a part of the Federal Constitution by proclamation of the
Secretary of the State, dated August 26, 1920 and which
reads as follows:
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"The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex. Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation."
Second, there is an elimination of paragraph 4 of the
present Section 1, thus doing away with the requirement of
the payment of a state or county tax within two years of
the election as a qualification of the elector to vote.
RESOLUTION NO. 6
This resolution provides an amendment to Article 9,
Section 8, which at the present reads as follows:
"The debt of any county, city, borough, township, school district or other municipality or incorporated district, except as provided herein, and in section
fifteen of this article, shall never exceed seven (7) per
centum upon the assessed value of the taxable property
therein, but the debt of the city of Philadelphia may be
increased in such amount that the total city debt of
said city shall not exceed ten per centum (10) upon
the assessed value of the taxable property therein, nor
shall any such municipality or district incur any new
debt, or increase its indebtedness to an amount exceeding two (2) per centum upon such assessed valuation
of property, without the consent of the electors thereof
at a public election in such manner as shall be provided
by law. In ascertaining the borrowing capacity of the
city of Philadelphia, at any time, there shall be deducted
from such debt so much of the debt of said city
as shall have been incurred, or is about to be
incurred, and the proceeds thereof expended, or about
to be expended, upon any public improvement, or in
the construction, purchase, or condemnation of any
public utility, or part thereof, or facility therefor, if such
public improvement or public utility, or part thereof,
whether separately or in connection with any other
public improvement or public utility, or part thereof,
may reasonably be expected to yield revenue in excess
of operating expenses sufficient to pay the interest and
sinking fund charges thereon. The method of determining such amount, so to be deducted, may be prescribed by the General Assembly.
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In incurring indebtedness for any purpose the
city of Philadelphia may issue its obligations maturing not later than fifty (50) years from the date
thereof, with provision for a sinking-fund sufficient to
retire said obligations at maturity, the payment to such
sinking-fund to be in equal or graded annual or other
periodical installments. Where any indebtedness shall
be or shall have been incurred by said city of Philadelphia for the purpose of the construction or improvements of public works or utilities of any character, from
which income or revenue is to be derived by said
city, or for the reclamation of land to be used in the
construction of wharves or docks owned or to be
owned by said city, such obligations may be in an
amount sufficient to provide for, and may include
the amount of, the interest and sinking-fund charges
accruing and which may accrue thereon throughout the period of construction, and until the expiration of one year after the completion of the work
for which said indebtedness shall have been incurred;
and said city shall not be required to levy a tax
to pay said interest and sinking-fund charges as required by section ten, article nine of the Constitution
of Pennsylvania, until the expiration of said period of
one year after the completion of said work."
The amendment would read as follows:
"Section 8. The debt of any city, borough, township, school district or other municipality or incorporated district except as provided herein, and in section
fifteen of this article, shall never exceed seven (7) per
centum upon the assessed value of the taxable property
therein, and the debt of any county, except as provided in section fifteen of this article, shall never exceed
ten (10) per centum upon the assessed value of the taxable realty therein, but the debt of the city and county
of Philadelphia may be increased in such amount that
the total city and county debt of said city and county
shall not exceed fifteen (15) per centum upon the assessed value of the taxable realty therein; nor shall any
municipality or district incur any new debt, or increase
its indebtedness, to an amount, exceeding two (2) per
centum upon such assessed valuation of taxable property, without the consent of the electors thereof at a
public election in such manner as shall be provided by
law. In ascertaining the borrowing capacity of the city
and county of Philadelphia, at any time, there shall be
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deducted from such debt so much of the debt of said city
and county as shall have been incurred, or is about to
be incurred, and the proceeds thereof expended, or
about to be expended, upon any public improvement, or
in the construction, purchase, or condemnation of any
public utility or part thereof, or facility therefor to the
extent that such public improvement or public utility,
or part thereof, whether separately, or in connection
with any other public improvement or public utility,
or part thereof, may yield, or may reasonably be
expected to yield, revenue in excess of operating
expenses sufficient to pay the interest and sinking fund
charges thereon. The method of determining such
amount, so to be deducted, may be prescribed by the
General Assembly.
In incurring indebtedness for any purpose the city
and county of Philadelphia may issue its obligations
maturing not later than fifty (50) years from the date
thereof, with provision for a sinking-fund sufficient to
retire said obligations at maturity, the payment to such
sinking-fund to be in equal or graded annual or other
periodical installments. Where any indebtedness shall
be, or shall have been incurred by said city and county
of Philadelphia for the purpose of the construction or
improvements of public works or utilities of any character, from which income or revenue is to be derived
by said city and county, or for the reclamation of
land to be used in the construction of wharves or docks
owned or to be owned by said city and county, such
obligations may be in an amount sufficient to provide
for, and may include the amount of, the interest and
sinking fund charges accruing and which may accrue
thereon throughout the period of construction and until
the expiration of one year after the completion of the
work for which said indebtedness shall have been incurred, but not in excess of five years from the time of
the incurring of such indebtedness; and said city and
county shall not be required to levy a tax to pay said
interest and sinking fund charges, as required by section ten, article nine of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, until the expiration of said period of one year
after the completion of said work."
It will be noted that the change in the maximum debt of a
county is proposed from seven (7) per centum to ten (10)
per centum but the method of ascertaining the percentage
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is also changed from the assessed value of taxable property to the assessed value of taxable realty. Furthermore, the
combined total debt of the city and county of Philadelphia
is placed at a maximum of fifteen (15) per centum likewise
to be calculated upon the assessed value of the taxable
realty therein. There are also several changes relative to
the method of calculating the borrowing capacity of the
city and county of Philadelphia and in providing for the
retirement of obligations issued through sinking fund
charges. The prime purpose of this proposed amendment
is to aid the solution of the debt situation of the city and
county of Philadelphia. The only change affecting other
portions of the state is in the change of the maximum indebtedness of counties and the base on which the percentage is to be calculated.
RESOLUTION NO. 7

This resolution provides an amendment to Article 17,
Section 3 which at present reads as follows:
"All individuals, associations and corporations
shall have equal right to have persons and property
transported over railroads and canals, and no undue
or unreasonable discrimination shall be made in
charges for, or in facilities for, transportation of
freight or passengers within the State or coming from
or going to any other State. Persons and property
transported over any railroad shall be delivered at any
station at charges not exceeding the charges for transportation of persons and property of the same class in
the same direction to any more distant station; but
excursion and commutation tickets may be issued at
special rates."
The amendment would read as follows:
"All individuals, associations and corporations
shall have equal rights to have persons and property
transported over railroads and canals, and no undue
or unreasonable discrimination shall be made in
charges for, or in facilities for, transportation of
freight or passengers within the State or coming from
or going to any other State."
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It will be noted that the amendment eliminates the latter clause of the present section entirely. The omitted portion involves what is known as the long and short haul
provision affecting the railroads of the State which are urging the change in order to permit a more just arrangement
of rates and in accordance with the determinations of the
Interstate Commerce Commission which already acted
upon the matter on January 12, 1933.
RESOLUTION NO. 8

This resolution suggests an amendment to Article 9, by
adding the following section:
"Section 17. The Governor, the Auditor General, and the State Treasurer, immediately upon the
adoption of this amendment by the electors, may borrow an amount not exceeding twenty-five million dollars to defray the expenses of the State government
for the biennium beginning June first, one thousand
nine hundred thirty-three; provided the General Assembly, at its regular session of one thousand nine
hundred thirty-three, has authorized the borrowing of
money for this purpose."
This amendment is necessary in order to empower the
General Assembly to borrow a requisite amount of money
to carry on the expenses of the State Government during
the present biennium. The necessity has been brought
about through appropriations for unemployment relief and
a steady falling off of revenues of the State from taxation.
RESOLUTION NO. 9
This resolution suggests an amendment to Article 9 by
adding thereto a new section to read as follows:
"Section 19. The City of Philadelphia, in constructing, for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof,
transit subways, rapid transit railways, or other local
transit facilities for the transportation of persons or
property, shall have the power, in order the more
justly to distribute the benefits and costs of such transit
facilities, to levy special assessments against such
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properties, whether abutting or not abutting. upon said
transit facilities; as are or will be specially and particularly benefited by the construction or operation of
such transit facilities; such power to be exercised in
accordance with existing or with future laws or pursuant to statutes enacted prior to the adoption of this
amendment but made effective by it. Such special
assessments when so levied, may be made payable
presently when levied or in installments over a period
of years, with or without interest and shall immediately, when so levied, be deducted from any indebtedness
incurred for such purposes in calculating the debt of
such city. Such city may acquire by eminent domain
either the fee or less estate or easements in land necessary for the construction or operation of such transit
facilities or for the disposal of earth or material excavated in the construction thereof or for other incidental purposes; but this provision shall not create any
additional powers for the condemnation of any railroad or street railway in operation."
The following comment upon this proposed amendment is found in the issue No. 1079, January 24, 1933, of
Citizens' Business, published by the Bureau of Municipal
Research, 311 South Juniper Street, Philadelphia, under the
caption "Benefit-Assessment Amendment".:
"An amendment to the state constitution which
would give the City of Philadelphia the power to levy
special assessments against property benefited by the
city's development of local transit facilities was passed
in the special session of the legislature in 1932. The
Amendment is again before the legislature (House
Bill 177).
Part of Costs on Property Benefited. A number
of advantages would accrue to the city in the proposed
grant of power. A primary advantage would be that
the city could place the burden of transit developments
on properties which are or which will be benefited by
the construction and operation of the transit facilities.
The general taxpayer would thereby be relieved of a
portion of the financial burden of transit. Not all the
property benefited by transit is immediately adjacent
to the transit line. In the proposed amendment, the
city will be authorized to levy an assessment upon any
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property benefiting from the transit facilities whether
or not the property abuts upon the transit facilities.
Sectional Pressure Restricted. Many plans have
been advanced for the extension of city-owned transit
lines into various areas. Pressure for these extensions comes largely from the sections which expect to
benefit. The proposed amendment, by making it possible to assess properties in the benefited areas, would
tend to counteract undue pressure. This would perhaps be the most important effect of the amendment.
However, if the section is thoroughly convinced as to
the benefits to be received, the special assessments
will not prevent the development of the extension.
And, if the general taxpayers desire, the way is open
to make any transit expansion which is desirable for

the common good without benefit assessments.
Borrowing Capacity Freed. A large part of the
borrowing capacity of the city is at present frozen in
transit loans. None of these transit loans will be
freed from the debt limit by the benefit-assessment
amendment, although another constitutional amendment now in course of adoption would give relief to
the extent that the facilities are self-supporting. But
the benefit-assessment amendment would give additional relief on new transit developments. It would
exempt from being a charge against the debt limit an
amount of debt equal to any special assessments that
might have been levied.
Further Action Necessary. If the amendment is
passed by the legislature now in session, it can be submitted to a vote of the people and adopted at the
municipal election next November. If it is not passed
by this legislature it cannot become part of the constitution before 1938, barring, of course, the possibility of a constitutional convention. It is desirable,
therefore, that the amendment be approved at the
present session. It would help Philadelphia."
As House Bill 177 this resolution was passed the second time by the General Assembly at the Regular Session
of 1933 and became known as resolution No. E-4.
RESOLUTION NO. 10

This resolution suggests an amendment to Article 15
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by adding thereto Section 5 as follows:
"The General Assembly may authorize cities to
take more land and property than is needed for actual
construction in the laying out, widening, extending or
relocating highways or streets connecting with bridges
crossing streams or tunnels under streams which form
boundaries between this and any other State, but the
additional land and property, so authorized to be
taken, shall not be more than sufficient to form suitable
building sites on such highways or streets. Nor shall
the authority hereby conferred be exercised in connection with the laying out, widening, extending or relocating of any highway or street at a point more
than three miles distant from the approach to any such
bridge or tunnel. After so much of the land and
property has been appropriated for such highways or
streets as is needed therefore, the remainder may be
sold or leased and any restrictions imposed thereupon
which will preserve or enhance the benefit to the public of the property actually needed for the aforesaid
public use.
This amendment confines to cities the authority proposed to be exercised and applies to highways approaching bridges and tunnels crossing or going under streams
interstate and obviously refers to the cities of Philadelphia
and Pittsburgh.
The following comment upon this proposed amendment is found in a recent issue No. 1112-September 12,
1933 of Citizens' Business, supra, under the caption "For
Better Bridge Approaches":
"On the ballot November 7 will be a proposed
constitutional amendment (No. 10) intended to facilitate the construction of suitable Delaware River
Bridge approaches. The amendment does not mention the bridge by name, but it would apply to laying
widening, extending, or relocating city highways
out,
.connecting
with bridges crossing streams or tunnels
under streams which form boundaries between this
and any other state'. If it is adopted, Philadelphia
could be authorized to take by eminent domain, in
addition to the land needed for highways themselves,
enough land for suitable building sites fronting on the
highways. Then, after having used what is needed
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for the highways, the city could sell or lease the rest,
imposing such restrictions as would 'preserve or enhance the benefit to the public' of the land needed for
the highways. This special power could be exercised
to a point three miles from the approaches to the
bridge (or tunnel).
Excess Condemnation. This is known in America as 'excess condemnation'. Why should a city
have power to use it? So that it can be sure of an
orderly and profitable development of land abutting
on public improvements. A highway cut through a
built-up section, where only enough land is taken for
the highway, often resembles the path of a hurricane.
Backyards, unsightly walls, parts of buildings-almost
anything may front on the new highway. This condition will be slow to right itself, and may never do so.
There are likely to be remnants of land of odd shapes
and sizes, no plot itself suitable for development on
the new front, with the plots held by many owners.
any one of whom is in position to block development.
The result is a longstanding eyesore and a failure of
both owners and the city to realize the full economic
possibilities of the land. Excess condemnation helps
to avoid such situations. It has been called 'a boon to
the property-owner-a blessing to the public'. A city
can take enough land for suitable development fronting on the improvement, can consolidate title to parcels previously held by different owners, and can sell
or lease the land subject to such restrictions as will
'protect' the improvement.
The Parkway Case. This would not be Philadelphia's first experience with excess condemnation. The
city attempted to use it in 1912, in the development of
the Parkway, but was stopped by the courts. The Act
of June 8, 1907, P.L. 466, gave cities power in developing parks, parkways, and playgrounds to condemn
private property within 200 feet of the improvement
and to sell this property with such restrictions as
would insure 'the preservation of the view, appearance, light, air, health, and usefulness' of the improvement. The Supreme Court (Pa. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
vs. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47-1913) held that this was
forbidden by the constitution. Private property could
be condemned for public use, but not for private use.
The excess condemnation might be for the public benefit, but the court, seeing that land might be taken from
one owner and sold to another, held that the taking
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would be for private use. This interpretation makes
it impossible to use excess condemnation in the development of bridge approaches unless the constitution
is amended."
In case of the adoption of this amendment the question
would still remain for solution by the Courts as to whether
this amendment is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution :
"No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Quoting from Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company v.
Philadelphia, supra, we find Mestrezat, J., declaring:
"Holding, as we do, that the use to be made of
property located outside a public highway is not a
public use for which private property may be taken
by the city against the consent of the owner, the effect of the Act of 1907 authorizing the appropriation
of property for such purpose is to permit by the exercise of eminent domain the taking of the property
of one citizen without his consent and vesting the title
thereto in another. No court in this country has yet
sanctioned such action by the State or its representative exercising the power of eminent domain. Says
Mr. Justice Story, speaking for the court in Wilkinson
v. Leland, 27 U. S. 658: 'We know of no case, in
which a legislative act to transfer the property of A.
to B., without his consent has ever been held a constitutional exercise of legislative power, in any state in
the Union. On the contrary, it has been constantly
resisted, as inconsistent with just principles, by every
judicial tribunal in which it has been attempted to
be enforced'."
RESOLUTION NO. 11

This resolution provides an amendment to Article 15,
Section 4. This section which was adopted by vote of the
people November 6, 1928, confers power on the General
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Assembly to provide for consolidations in the Municipal
Governments in the County of Allegheny. Pursuant to the
power granted by this article the General Assembly passed
an Act of Assembly proposing a Consolidated City Charter,
but this charter was rejected by the voters of the several
municipalities at a special election held on June 5, 1929.
(See the Act of April 18, 1929 P. L. 573, and Pittsburgh's
Consolidated City Charter, 297 Pa. 502.)
The amendment proposed by this resolution confers on
the General Assembly further power in respect to proposing
a consolidated charter. It applies solely to the County of
Allegheny and presents a problem the determination of
which is for the electors of that County although it will be
voted upon by the electors at large throughout the state.
RESOLUTION NO. 12

This resolution suggests an amendment to Article 9, by
adding thereto the following section :
"Section 16. In addition to the purposes stated
in article nine, section four, of this Constitution, the
General Assembly may provide by law, for the issue
of bonds, to the amount of ten millions of dollars, for
the purpose of acquiring toll bridges, and may by law,
provide that, upon the acquisition of any such bridge,
tolls may be charged for the use thereof, sufficient to
pay the interest and sinking fund charges on such
bonds and the cost of the maintenance of such bridges,
until the bonds issued have been retired and such
bridges are freed from tolls."
The adoption of this amendment by the vote of the
people would authorize the General Assembly to increase
the debt of the Commonwealth to the extent of ten millions
of dollars to be used for the acquisition of toll bridges. The
debt as created will be paid by the collection of tolls from
the bridges so acquired and after such liquidation of the
debt the bridges will be free for the use of the travelling
public.

Chambersburg, Pa.
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